Mexico's Oil Price–Hedging Programme
Sovereign fiscal insurance since the 1990s · Executed by Banco de México
Oil share of federal revenue
>30%
Peak MTM value (2009)
~$10B
2008 WTI crash
−72%
Option type used
Asian term put
The Problem
Oil revenues fund over 30% of Mexico's federal budget. A sharp price drop threatens public spending, destabilises markets, and can force emergency austerity.
The Solution
Each year, Mexico buys Asian term put options on Maya crude, locking in a floor price consistent with the federal budget. If prices crash, the options pay out.
Why it worked in 2009
WTI collapsed from $140 to $40. Mexico's hedges generated nearly $10bn in mark-to-market value, publicly disclosed to anchor investor confidence.
The FEIP fund
The Oil Income Stabilisation Fund (FEIP) holds hedge premiums and profits. But its limited size ($1–6bn) means it can't absorb big shocks alone — the hedge programme fills the gap.
FEIP Fund Balance (illustrative, $bn)
Source: Duclaud & García, "Mexico's Oil Price–Hedging Program", IMF Chapter 15. Views are those of the authors and do not represent official IMF or Banco de México policy.
Hedge Simulator
Adjust parameters to see how the option pays off in different oil price scenarios
Programme Parameters
Strike price (budget reference, $/bbl)$57
Average realised oil price ($/bbl)$49
Export volume (billion bbl/year)0.45
Option premium paid ($/bbl)$4.18
Net hedge payoff
Payoff = max(0, Strike − Avg price) × Volume − Premium cost. This models a single Asian term put with term settlement.
The Derivatives Toolkit
How instruments evolved — and why Asian term puts won
Option payoff diagram — put option
Net P&L with hedge Unhedged oil revenue Strike price
Option cost comparison — WTI $87.50 strike (Dec 2011)
Option typePremium ($/bbl)Payoff mechanicCashflows
★ Preferred Asian term settled$4.18Avg price vs strike over 12 months1
European term settled$5.21Spot price vs strike at expiry1
Asian monthly (strip)$5.61Avg per calendar month vs strike12
European monthly settled$8.31Monthly spot vs strike at expiry12
Why Asian options beat European in 2009
Oil prices crashed from $140 to $30 mid-year, then recovered to above strike by December. A European option (checks price only at expiry) would have expired worthless — zero payout. The Asian option (checks average price across all 252 trading days) would have settled in-the-money, fully compensating for the months of low prices, regardless of the recovery.
Underlying: Maya crude
80%+ of Mexico's production. No screen market — priced by PMI as: 0.40×(WTX Sour + Fuel Oil) + 0.10×(LLS + Brent) + K. Eliminates basis risk vs WTI/Brent proxies.
Strike price logic
Set OTM at delta 10–25%, calibrated to the federal budget oil reference price. Balances protection against catastrophic downside with manageable premium cost.
Historical Performance
Programme years and estimated outcomes — the 2009 vintage is the landmark
Year
Description
Strike ($/bbl)
Avg price ($/bbl)
Outcome
2001
Post 9/11 demand shock
$16
$17
OTM
2002
Iraq war premium, stable
$17
$21
OTM
2005
Katrina supply disruption
$27
$42
OTM
2006
Rising commodity super-cycle
$35
$53
OTM
2008
Pre-crisis WTI peaks at $140
$49
$85
OTM
2009
★ Financial crisis — landmark year
$70
$57
ITM ~$5B
2010
Recovery year, prices rebound
$59
$72
OTM
2011
Arab Spring supply premium
$65
$99
OTM
Note: OTM (out-of-the-money) outcomes are NOT losses — they mean oil prices exceeded the budget price, boosting revenues beyond forecast. Premium cost is insurance, not a sunk cost. ITM = payout received. Figures are illustrative based on publicly reported programme data.
Governance Structure
Three-tier oversight — Ministry of Finance → Subcommittee → Banco de México
FEIP Technical Committee
Ministry of Finance · Decides whether to hedge and sets the resource envelope
Oil Price–Hedging Subcommittee
Finance + PEMEX + Energy Ministry + Banco de México · Designs instruments
Banco de México — Executing Agent
Trades put options · Manages counterparties · Runs collateral under ISDA agreements
Execution process
Counterparty selection
BdM runs thorough analysis of institutions' market coverage, valuation methodology, risk-warehousing capacity, and trading platform depth before inviting them to bid.
Legal framework
All trades governed by ISDA master agreements. Zero-threshold collateral policies eliminate credit risk. Eligible collateral: highly rated government fixed-income only.
Execution discipline
BdM enters market opportunistically — buying when implied volatility is low and liquidity is high. Keeping the programme confidential reduces market impact and cost.
Collateral management
Daily mark-to-market margin calls. As option value rises, counterparties post more collateral to BdM. Transparency reports flow to MoF and auditors throughout.